A blog about planning, planning law and planning policy
Disclaimer The information on this blog is not intended to be advice, legal or otherwise. You should not rely on it and I do not accept liability in connection with it. If you do have a planning law question on which you would like advice, seek legal advice from a suitably qualified solicitor. Specific advice should be sought for specific problems.
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A planning agreement has been found invalid and the planning permission it supported has been quashed in the recent case of Westminster City Council v. Secretary of State (27th March 2013). It is a salutary case.
The SofS granted permission on appeal. There was a deed submitted and claimed to contain planning obligations. They were:
1 Not to apply for a parking permit
2 To notify prospective owners that they will not be entitled to apply for a parking permit
3 That leases of the property will contain a covenant in favour of the lessor and Westminster City Council not to apply for a permit, and
4 To send the council a copy any lease granted.
In an admirably clear and short judgment the Court held this was not within s.106(1) and was therefore not a planning obligation. Nor of course would it run with the land.
As a consequence the permission was quashed as the Secretary of State had taken it into account.
So the lesson for applicants and appellants is to ask whether the promises you want to put into your planning agreement do fall within s.106. For example, will that promise to comply with a travel plan fall within s.106?
Planning authorities will want to ask themselves the same question. In the Westminster case, it is interesting that the validity point was not taken at the planning appeal. It was not raised until they made the High Court challenge.
But there are also lessons for the Secretary of State. His Inspector granted permission in his name on the basis of a set of promises which were not s.106 obligations. They were unenforceable against successors in title. The Inspector spent time checking that they met the old policy tests in Circular 5/05, now unhelpfully turned into restrictive legal tests by Reg 122 of the CIL regulations. But he failed completely to consider the basic point: were they actually under s.106 at all? Because if they weren’t they would be unenforceable once the property was sold. But if s.106 had not been rewritten in 1991 by the Planning & Compensation Act this problem would not have happened. The previous wording, in s.106 as enacted in 1990, and its predecessor, s.52 of the 1971 Act, was much wider.
It is over 10 years since I raised points like these in “Planning obligations, ideas for reform” and the Law Society’s Planning and Environmental Law committee has raised them several times, recently urging the Government to include reform in the latest planning bill. But DCLG and its predecessors resolutely refuse to address the problem. Their current view is that planning authorities and applicants should get proper advice, and if they make mistakes that is their own look-out. But this ignores the uphill struggle experienced by those who get and give proper advice. They are faced with surprise and incomprehension when they raise the question of whether the promises are within s.106 and try to draft to keep within its boundaries. And when drafting within the boundaries it is not always easy to produce something which is workable. The judge in the Westminster case was shown drafting which did meet s.106’s constraints and commented that the result was draconian. It required use of the dwelling to cease if anyone applied for a car-parking permit. The judge doubted the court would eject a family for such a breach.
DCLG also keeps saying that ministers are not interested in s.106 as we now have CIL. But CIL does not totally replace s.106. Planning agreements are still appropriate and needed for on-site issues and not all councils – 25%I recall – are expected to introduce CIL
The Inspectorate itself, staffed by experienced planning professionals, has failed to spot a fundamentally flawed planning agreement. Westminster City Council also failed to spot it until the last minute.
The result is the waste of several thousands of pounds of taxpayers money in legal fees quashing the Secretary of State’s decision. Westminster’s costs will of course have to be met by DCLG.
The failure of DCLG to amend s.106 wastes the time and money of landowners, developers, planning authorities and now Central Government which will have to pay Westminster’s costs. Surely DCLG will now see the wisdom of addressing the problems of the straitjacket which is s.106.
Last Friday the National Trust, English Heritage and East Northamptonshire District Council succeeded in quashing the Secretary of State’s decision to grant permission for a wind farm which would affect the setting of Lyveden New Bield, the Grade I unfinished Tudor house and garden. They succeeded on three grounds, failure to give effect to the duty to pay special regard to the desirability of preserving the building or its setting or its features of special architectural or historic interest (s.66(1) of the Listed Buildings Act 1990), failure to interpret and apply planning policy correctly and failure to give adequate reasons I am not going to look at the second and third grounds, but the first ground causes difficulties when we think about the traditional approach to material considerations.
Section 66 speaks of the need to pay special regard to the desirability of preserving the setting. The case law history of the section began in 1988 with Steinberg v. Secretary of State, a decision which surprised most planning lawyers, the more so as it was a successful challenge by two litigants in person. The Court decided that there was no evidence that the equivalent provision for conservation areas, which required special attention to be paid to the desirability of preserving or enhancing the area, had been taken into account. Importantly it held that the underlying purpose of the section was positive, rather than simply preventing harm.
Then in Bath Society v. Secretary of State, the Court of Appeal volunteered views on what paying special attention meant. It must, they said, be regarded as having considerable importance and weight. The House of Lords in South Lakeland v. Secretary of State had to consider Bath and the Steinberg and said that “There is no dispute that the intention of section 277(8) is that planning decisions in respect of development proposed to be carried out in a conservation area must give a high priority to the objective of preserving or enhancing the character or appearance of the area. If any proposed development would conflict with that objective, there will be a strong presumption against the grant of planning permission, though, no doubt, in exceptional cases the presumption may be overridden in favour of development which is desirable on the ground of some other public interest”. And so, in Lyveden New Bield the Court said that “a decision maker should accord considerable importance and weight to the “desirability of preserving…the setting” of listed buildings”.
This line of reasoning however goes contrary to the classic approach to material considerations which is that weight is for the decision maker to decide –see a string of cases such as Seddon Properties in 1980, ending in Tesco v. Secretary of State in 1995. The Court in Lyveden recognised this and said that the words of Lord Hoffman in Tesco had to be qualified when s.66 is in play. It also goes contrary to the language of the sections, which simply state that special regard or special attention is to be paid to a particular aspect. The duty to pay regard to something has long been held to be just that; pay regard, and having paid regard, take your decision. But the decision does not have to accord with the thing to which you have paid regard. So paying special regard should be approached in the same way. Look at this factor especially, think about it very carefully, and having done so, take your decision. If Parliament had wanted to say that the factor was to have extra weight, it could have said so. But it didn’t, and rightly so, because if it had done that it would have had to have said how much extra weight, and in a system where weight of everything else is left to the decision maker, you can’t do that without specifying the weight to be given to everything.
Go to this BBC iPlayer podcast of today’s PM programme (http://www.bbc.co.uk/i/b01qdzc2/) for an interesting five minute report on the difficulties caused by (and apparent aims of) the Habitats Directive (51 minutes and 21 seconds through the podcast, available till 13th February). Bernard Jenkin MP is campaigning against it. CPRE claim that the Government has said it wants to repeal/amend the directive. The problem with the Habitats directive is in my view not so much that it seeks to preserve habitats and promote biodiversity, but that it prescribes what the decision is to be if certain circumstances exist. So if there is a likelihood of significant effects on a Special Area of Conservation or Special Protection Area, authorities can only approve the project after having ascertained that it will not adversely affect the integrity of the site concerned. Their discretion is severely limited. The Directive tells them what to do, namely to refuse planning permission. It might be thought this is contrary to the subsidiarity principle. And to localism. George Osborne commissioned a review in 2011 of the operation of the directive in this country, (see my earlier post here) and there is now a special unit within Government to assist developments and authorities to navigate the rules. But in truth is it not time to renegotiate the directive so as to restore discretion to member states?
What do people think?
Good news I feel with yesterday’s announcement that the Government’s Red Tape challenge is now to look at planning. Planning minister Nick Boles said “Unnecessary technical regulations that are no longer needed will be removed”. That sounds like a clear pledge.
This follows the welcome simplification of design and access statements and the reduction in validation hurdles announced before Christmas (on which I commented here). There is a relatively short time to respond however – five weeks (presumably from the announcement yesterday) – so get your response in before 7th March.
The announcement says the review “will feed into the department’s wider work to help deliver a more streamlined, effective and accessible planning system, while maintaining necessary safeguards”. Roger Hepher of Savills, one of the Sector champions says in the announcement “Although we’ve lost a certain amount of red tape since 2010, there’s still plenty around. This government is giving all those interested in the planning system an unprecedented opportunity to clear the decks of unnecessary rules and regulations that remain, and to address the bits previous initiatives have missed.“
This is an important opportunity therefore and one on which the Government can be held to account. So what are the unnecessary technical regulations? What are the “unnecessary rules and regulations that remain” and “the bits previous initiatives have missed”?
First on my list are the unnecessarily restrictive provisions of section 106. There is no need to stop planning authorities from agreeing that a section 106 agreement is not to be enforced against some successors in title. There is no need for it to state that an obligation to make a payment can only be to a planning authority – what about parish councils for example? Or an NHS Trust? There is no need for it to be so tightly drafted that a planning obligation cannot easily require a compliance with a travel plan (how does an obligation to offer season ticket loans fall within s.106?). There are other problems with s.106 and s.106A but there is not enough space in this blogpost. You can read about some of them in, for example, “Planning obligations – ideas for reform” which I wrote eleven years ago – [2002] JPL 12. I have posted about the Welsh approach here . And the Law Society has made many representations to Government about it, the most recent of which was in its briefing on the Growth and Infrastructure Bill, currently in Parliament.
Second is the complexity of the LDF system. It is simply overburdened with stages and the law which implements it is labyrinthine. It is possible to have a simpler system. I believe that the LDF system was conceived to be capable of rapid change. It is a portfolio of DPDs, any one of which is meant to be able to be changed to meet changes of circumstance. But in practice, the system appears to be more ossified than its predecessor.
Third on my list is Regulation 123 of the CIL Regulations. This will, from 6th April 2014 at the latest effectively limit the number of planning obligations which can contribute to a type or piece of infrastructure where there are already five or more. The aim of this is to encourage or force planning authorities to move to CIL. But why? That’s not localism. Some local authorities may have good reason for sticking with s.106.
My fourth issue is not about regulations, but about attitude. The points I make about s.106 have been made for over a decade. No-one has ever said they are bad points. They address issues which delay the drafting of s.106 agreements and make the process more expensive than it need be. If taken up, unenforceable provisions in s.106s would be avoided (there is at least one disappointed parish council out there not receiving a payment of money, and litigation has struck down s.106 obligations to transfer land – the local authority was the loser). But the consistent response from Government since CIL was conceived has been that ministers would not want to signal that they want to make s.106 broader, they want authorities to use CIL. But this ignores the fact that s.106 is envisaged as being used for site specific issues, alongside CIL.
There is another aspect to this and that is the approach to consultation. Government consults widely, but it is not actually taking much notice of the responses. The best example I have of this is on CIL which I blogged about here. I am closer to the school of thought which says that governments are elected to govern. If they make a hash of it, that will be reflected at the next election. So they should decide what they want to do, taking advice from their civil service, and then do it, without asking for free advice from everybody. But if they do decide to ask for that free advice, then they ought to read it and act accordingly. At the moment, I am far from convinced that there is much to be gained by responding to government consultations. But nonetheless I would encourage people to respond on this one – this is a link to the consultation response page.
At last. The onerous requirements on what has to be included with an outline planning application are being relaxed by an amendment order laid before Parliament yesterday and coming into force on 31st January 2013. It was in 2006 that the definitions of what constituted had to go in with an outline planning application were changed and design and access statements were introduced.
As a result where layout is a reserved matter the application for outline planning permission has to state the approximate location of buildings, routes and open spaces included in the development proposed and where scale is a reserved matter the application must state the upper and lower limit for the height, width and length of each building included in the development proposed. This might work for an application for single building, but it caused huge problems for larger developments, especially housing applications for hundreds or thousands of houses. (And might have fuelled the samey-ness of modern residential developments which the Minister, Nick Boles, complained about earlier this month). So it is a relief to read that the requirements for location of buildings, routes and open spaces, height width and length of each building are deleted from 31st January. But it does make you wonder who drafts this stuff in the first place. Who actually dreams up these requirements and do they have any experience at the sharp end of doing a planning application?
We can ask the same question about Community Infrastructure Levy, where the regulations have just been amended for the second time to correct errors in the first regulations (or three times if you count the fact they almost failed to have any transitional arrangements at all). This “simple” levy is becoming very difficult to understand, and I am not the only lawyer who is still unclear about what some parts of the latest amendments mean. Those amendments – to deal with s.73 applications – fail also to amend Reg 123. That’s the one which limits the number of planning obligations which can be pooled. Logically the planning obligations which go with the s.73 permission should be ignored, but that hasn’t been done. And the draftsman of the Growth and Infrastructure Bill doesn’t know the difference between a planning obligation and a planning agreement. Now we all make mistakes, and I don’t want to pillory anybody (we can safely leave that to MPs and Select Committees) but legislating and drafting legislation does need a bit of care.
So here is my last example for today. The nice new regulations removing the requirement to detail the height, width and length of every building in an outline planning application also make welcome amendments to attack the problem of local lists of requirements for a planning application. These are a source of expense and uncertainty about what must go in to make an application valid. These changes will apply from 31st June 2013. Yes, 31st June. So is that actually 30th June? Or 1st July? Or 31st July? Or maybe it’s meant to be 31st January which is the day the regulations come into force.
Who drafts this stuff?
David Cameron today launched an attack on judicial review and excessive procedural requirements. He bemoans excessive EU legislation, saying “Consultations, impact assessments, audits, reviews, stakeholder management, securing professional buy-in, complying with EU procurement rules, assessing sector feedback this is not how we became one of the most powerful, prosperous nations on earth”.
Now I have some sympathy with the criticism of over-consultation and difficult EU legislation. We have constant consultation on statutory instruments and what look like inappropriate EU laws. But what does Government do with the consultation results? When I was Chairman of the Law Society’s Planning & Environmental Law Committee we were consulted on the Community Infrastructure Levy regulations. We pointed out they had no transitional provisions, so they would be retrospective. Did anyone take any notice? The final draft was published with the same omission. Only a last minute representation by us ensured that pre-regulation planning permissions were not caught.
The Government complains about the operation of the Habitats Directive and George Osborne sets up an inquiry at Defra into how infrastructure projects can go ahead more easily despite its provisions, but this is useless unless the Directive is changed. Yet there is no appetite for this, despite the directive causing problems in several Member States.
And so the spotlight turns on judicial review, the mechanism by which government is held to account for compliance with the law. The time limits are to be reduced and the appeals are to be truncated. The threat of JR, leading to declarations of invalidity, is serious. It delays investment (while the challenge period of three months passes, or if there is a challenge, until it finishes leaving the decision intact). But this threat will not be reduced by reducing the time limit. And nor should it be. Because Government must comply with the law. We live in a country which prides itself on its adherence to the rule of law – “be you ever so high, you are not above the law”. In that way we guarantee freedom and liberty.
The answer is not to attack JR, but to have better laws and better decisions. For example, why are there limits on what a section 106 agreement can do? Why can it not address travel plans? Why must it always be enforceable against all persons deriving title from the original covenantor? Why must we have design and access statements? Why can local planning authorities not use a planning obligation as a reason to grant planning permission where there are already five planning obligations contributing to the same infrastructure project.
Is it surprising that we don’t have better decisions when even the Growth and Infrastructure Bill is confused about the difference between a planning obligation and the instrument by which the planning obligation is entered into? And how are we going to fare when planning obligations are reviewed for viability, with no definition of viability? Or when the cause of lack of viability is affordable housing – how can we tell it is affordable housing rather than a bad bargain with the landowner?
The need is for good laws, and a Government which is confident it can deliver decisions in compliance with those laws. We should not be limiting the right to challenge unlawful decisions.
I promised to comment further on aspects of the Growth and Infrastructure Bill. The first part I want to look at is the parts on affordable housing. They allow for the variation of affordable housing requirements if the development is “not economically viable”.
The provisions allow for more than one application to be made and in the case of the first, if the affordable housing requirement makes the development not economically viable, the LPA is obliged to make a variation to make the development economically viable. The determination of the LPA may not, in the case of the first application, make the “obligation” more onerous in its application to the applicant than the unmodified “obligation”. In the case of second and subsequent applications the determination can be more onerous but must still not make the development economically unviable.
There is to be a right of appeal. If the Secretary of State decides to modify the obligation he must also determine that, if the development has not been completed within three years, (a) his modification ceases to have effect and (b) the development may not be completed until there is a new agreement on affordable housing between the applicant and the LPA.
That last part strikes me as strange. Firstly, what about large developments which take much longer than three years to complete? Secondly, if the LPA and the applicant can’t agree, the development will come to a standstill. Thirdly (and this can be sorted out with a suitable amendment) what happens if the original applicant has sold and isn’t on the scene three years on?
Let’s also think about the phrase “economically viable”. What does that actually mean? There is provision for the Secretary of State to issue guidance, so perhaps that will help. Then how is that test applied? New section 106BA(3) says that if the affordable housing requirement makes the development not economically viable the variations must be made. But how do we tell if the AH requirement is the cause, rather than for example the price to be paid to the landowner?
Lastly, there is a problem with the use of the phrase “planning obligation”. In section 106, a planning obligation means the individual promises in the planning agreement. This is quite clear from s.106(9) which says “A planning obligation may not be entered into except by an instrument executed as a deed…”. But in the new sections in the Bill the phrase planning obligation is used to mean the deed. I haven’t had time to work out the effect of this, but it is going to lead to confusion. The CIL regulations have a provision restricting the number of planning obligations which can contribute to a piece of infrastructure. When I was chair of the Law Society’s Planning Law Committee I checked with DCLG’s lawyers that they really meant the individual obligations and not the deed. They confirmed that to be the intent, which is correct, so it is unfortunate to go the other way in this Bill. But hopefully it can be rectified during the Parliamentary process.
The Growth and Infrastructure Bill was introduced in Parliament yesterday. It is effectively a new planning bill making the changes some of which have been trailed already this autumn). It is relatively short, at 28 sections. I will blog on individual provisions at greater length in due course, but to note now:
1 It allows for applications to be made direct to the Secretary of State where the authority is “designated” by the SofS – presumably one which is underperforming. I can’t see that consequential amendments needed to allow the s.106 agreement to be made with the Sof S are there.
2 It has provisions for amending s.106 affordable housing requirements if the development is not economically viable because of them.
3 It amends the already complex provisions for review of minerals permissions. I hope it makes them simpler.
4 It removes the special parliamentary procedure which did apply some applications for development consent for infrastructure projects under the Planning Act 2008. This problem has been highlighted by the Rookery South development consent which is currently stalled in Parliament having received the go ahead from the Infrastructure Planning Commission (which was ironically its first, last and only decision before it was abolished and transferred to the Planning Inspectorate).
5 It will allow the SofS to direct that certain planning applications are dealt with under the development consent process.
That’s not all of course. But it should straightaway be noted that the affordable housing changes will come into effect on Royal Assent.
In my last post, I suggested that s.106 should be amended, following the lead of the Welsh Government, and I listed two bills in which this might be done. The Secretary of State now has his own bill in which he can do this.
I have posted and written on a number of occasions about the deficiencies and legal difficulties caused by the current wording of s.106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. So it is particularly encouraging to see that they are being taken up in Wales.
The Welsh Government recently commissioned an independent advisory group to look into planning reform in Wales and the prospect of a Welsh planning Act. The group’s wide ranging report was published at the end of last month and contains the following conclusion on s.106:
“We have concluded that statutory planning agreements must continue to have an important role in the planning system but the present arrangements embodied in S.106 could be improved to make the provisions more flexible and to address a number of technical legal issues. We favour a return to the more flexible provisions that existed prior to 1993 and we note the more flexible terms in which the equivalent provisions are drafted in Scottish legislation. To the extent that the present powers in S.106 are a reflection of concern that “planning gain” should be related to planning considerations we consider that this has now been met by policy and case-law based tests and the tests now embodied in statutory provision in the CIL regulations.”
In particular, the report drew attention to the lack of powers to deal with land transfer, the problems with enforcing lorry routeing agreements and green travel plans, the absence of powers to pay money to third parties such as community councils (and absence of power of such councils to enforce payment) and the problem where the council is both planning authority and landowner – can it contract with itself? There are other serious issues such as releasing landowners from liability and the time which must elapse before s.106B can be used. They need to be addressed by legislation. So I am also encouraged that the Welsh Assembly debate on the report, while not looking at the s.106 problem specifically, welcomed the report.
My hope is that DCLG and the English Government now pick up these issues and address them. Through the Law Society, they have been drawn to the attention of DCLG and its predecessor departments for over a decade. This really is something which makes the negotiation of s.106 agreements and therefore the grant of planning permission slower and more expensive. George Osborne often criticises the system for just that sort of problem. He is currently sponsoring a planning related bill through Parliament, the Infrastructure and Financial Assistance Bill. His colleague, Vince Cable, is sponsoring the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill. I do hope that space and time can be found in one bill or the other to put right these problems.
This is a link to the Welsh report. The parts on s.106 are at pages 95 – 99 (or 112 – 116 when you count every page in Adobe reader).
When the Planning Act 2008 was in preparation, it was always envisaged that it could be extended to other forms of development. Well the ministerial statement last week specifically contemplates that to speed up the system. Eric Pickles said:
“…we now intend to review the thresholds for some of the existing categories in the regime, and also to bring new categories of commercial and business development into the regime – making it possible for such schemes, where they are of sufficient significance, to be considered and determined at a national level. We will also work to extend the principle of a one-stop-shop for non-planning consents for major infrastructure, and amend the Special Parliamentary procedures which apply to major infrastructure to ensure they are fit for purpose.”
To deal with the Special Parliamentary Procedure point first, this is an arcane safeguard, and I would encourage the Government to look at it generally. It is generally accepted that under the Planning Act 2008 it has created unforeseen difficulties.
Now to the intention of widening the Planning Act system not only by lowering the thresholds, but also by including more commercial and business development. The system is now well under way, and beginning to be better understood. A small cadre of lawyers is familiar with it. It is front loaded with technicality and procedure for the promoter. And in my experience, it is not engaging with local authorities, or rather, local authorities are not engaging with it. Understandably, as they are not the decision making authority, they may see little point in becoming involved, a devoting scarce resources to it.
But how does this work with the localism agenda? It is the centralisation of planning and we surely see here the move to removing major planning decisions from the hands of local authorities, and into the hands of the Secretary of State. Yes, into his hands, because one of the first (and in my view correct) actions of the current Government was to amend the Planning Act so as to require the Secretary of State, rather than the technocratic IPC, to take the decision. But as I said in my last post, why not just use the call in system, or at least use it while the necessary legislation is being put in place?
I suspect the reason for not using call-in is that the Conservatives are haunted by the memory of the last Secretary of State who was not afraid to take decisions out of the hands of local authorities where he wanted to get the economy moving. Here he is:

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