I have been wondering for some time whether there is something other than increasing the supply of planning permissions which is needed to address the housing shortage and affordability. The Government has pledged to construct 1,000,000 houses during the life of this Parliament, by 2020 therefore. They also pledge 200,000 Starter Homes in the same period. That sounds positive, but Governments do not actually build houses any more. That is almost exclusively the function of the private sector.
The Government also points to the rise in numbers of dwellings granted permission last year (242,000 in the year to June 2015) and 170,690 net additional dwellings in 2014-15, a rise of 25% over the previous year. These are significant rises. But there is some way to go to reach the target of 200,000 per annum. In addition, house price inflation is running at 10% p.a. (for the year to October 2015 – see the FT on 5th November quoting the Halifax/Savills survey released on 29th October), and estate agents routinely announce, trumpet even, that there are nine buyers chasing each dwelling for sale in some areas. Housing is becoming less and less affordable. Between the first quarter of 1989 and the third quarter of 2015 first time buyer house prices in the UK as a whole have risen from 3.8 times average wages to 5.1 times. In London they have risen from 5.6 times to 9.6 times (source, Nationwide). The problem even applies to the new Starter Homes initiative. A couple, both on an average salary would struggle to buy one in 90% of all council areas in the South-East according to Savills’ research quoted by Anne Ashworth in The Times yesterday.
What has triggered my thinking is observing the way large housing sites are actually built and sold. Whilst there are sites with permission for sometimes thousands of houses, not all the houses come forward at the same time. Now of course there are practical construction reasons why the developments are phased. One can’t have too many developers at work simultaneously – there would be clashes between machinery, deliveries and construction programmes. In addition, the on-site infrastructure needs to be installed, and to keep up front costs under control that will be phased as well. The BBC Today programme however ran a piece on 3rd November 2015 pointing out that at Ebbsfleet there has been a planning permission for 15,000 dwellings for some years yet since construction began in 2007 only 350 dwellings have been built. (See this link for further details.) Now the banking crisis has of course intervened, but even so this is a remarkably slow rate of delivery, explained by the industry by reference to the cost of site preparation. That is odd, as the site preparation costs would normally have been estimated and allowed for in the original proposal.
Recently, figures about the decline of the small and medium sized house-builder have been getting some publicity. The Lyons Housing Review highlighted that whilst in the 1980s there were 10,000 active SME builders who between the delivered about 57% of housing, in 2013 there were only 2,800, producing 27%. Matthew Parris, writing in The Times on 14th November championed small housebuilders. Having first observed that “We face a crisis on housing. We need a lot more, fast. And something seems to be blocking what you might call the elasticity of the housebuilding industry’s response to a huge and compelling increase in demand. Demand soars, need screams, profit beckons, but supply still creeps. There appears to be a stickiness in the system. The latest figures show housebuilding substantially up. Good. But it needs to soar.” He went on to suggest that the small housebuilders have a role to play in doing smaller developments which, he said, do not attract the volume housebuilders as their business models demand the economies of scale offered by large sites. Parris attributes the decline in SME builders to their credit having dried up and his suggestion is for Government credit guarantees to be offered.
But I wonder if there is another way in which housebuilders, small and large, could help to increase supply, rate of build and affordability, namely by being more numerous. 75% of new housing is delivered by the volume housebuilders. That is between six and ten companies, depending on where you go for your definition. Which is a very small number of players controlling their delivery. The trick in marketing new houses is of course to bring them onto the market at slightly less than the rate of demand. If the rate of delivery exceeds demand, prices will fall. But with only ten major players in the market, there is not so much competition. One way to increase competition would be to split up the current volume housebuilders into smaller entities. If there were more players, there would be more competition, which normally drives down prices in a combination of more supply and more players competing for purchasers.
Whilst the Government is doubtless very reluctant to see house prices drop, the current rate of increase is highly problematic. Furthermore, the increased numbers of houses being permitted does not seem to be addressing the issue. The Office of Fair Trading studied the industry in 2008 (Homebuilding in the UK: A market study, September 2008, Office of Fair Trading) and concluded there was little evidence of competition problems or ability to restrict prices. Whilst I would not argue against granting more permissions, the problem is moving to getting those permissions built out, and it would seem sensible to review the OFT’s 2008 conclusion. A review of the competitiveness of the new housing market by the newly established Competition and Markets Authority would be the first step.
Today’s Times carries an extract form Bill Bryson’s new book “The Road to Little Dribbling; More Notes From a Small Island”. Under the headline “We ought to be appalled to see what is happening to the green belt”, the extract is a paean for the retention of the green belt. But it slips between green belt and green field, almost equating the two and fails to maintain the important distinction. It lists the benefits of the green belt, but fails to note the problems – such as increased journey times, air pollution, and the creation of a belt beyond the belt of highly priced rural properties, in ideal commuting locations.
And Bryson adds to the mythology of the undoubtedly beneficial green belts by claiming, erroneously, that “The notion of green belts was enshrined in the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act”. It was not. The first green belt, around London, was created under the Green Belt (London and Home Counties) Act 1938. Apart from that, the basis for green belts is entirely in policy, which, unlike legislation, can be changed by policy makers. Unlike the laws of the Medes and the Persians, green belts can be repealed, or changed. We don’t have to go back to King Darius and Daniel in the Lion’s Den (read Daniel, Chapter 6 if you want to see the unfortunate consequences) to see how undesirable it is to make things immutable.
The Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills, Sajid Javid, launched proposals for productivity on Friday 11th July, in a Command Paper called “Fixing the Foundations”. The parts which got press coverage were the reforms to planning.
In outline, the major changes are to adopt a zoning system for brownfield sites, under which sites on the statutory registers of brownfield land suitable for housing would have an automatic deemed planning permission; and to allow upward extensions in London up to the height of adjoining buildings, where neighbours do not object. This is coupled with allowing housing proposals to use the Nationally Significant Infrastructure Project process in the Planning Act 2008, a fast-track certificate to establish the principle of minor development proposals and a dispute resolution process for s.106 agreements. There will also be a tightening of the planning performance regime. The local plan process and length will be streamlined and the Secretary of State will intervene to write local plans where local planning authorities do not meet a deadline, to be set before the summer recess, for plans to be put in place.
It is interesting that the paper recites the removal of the “top down regional strategies”, putting “local authorities at the forefront of deciding how to meet the need for housing through their local plans”. Yet this manifestation of localism is having to yield to reality, with the Government having to force authorities to get on with the job.
But it is a sad turn of events that leads us to abandon, in the case of brownfield sites, our well developed case by case planning system, in favour of a presumption that they are suitable for housing. The trouble with the well developed system is that for twenty years from 1990 it was not under-pinned by the presumption in favour of development that accompanied the existence of planning controls for the previous eighty years. The legacy of those twenty years, notwithstanding George Osborne’s announcement in the 2011 Budget of a presumption in favour of sustainable development, is a culture of control rather than enablement.
Fixing the Foundations describes it like this: “Previous studies have found that the country’s planning system –where development proposals require individual planning permission and are subject to detailed and discretionary scrutiny –can create the sort of “slow, expensive and uncertain process” that reduces the appetite to build.” Government is now committed to removing all unnecessary obstacles to the redevelopment of brownfield land, “including these sorts of planning obstacles”.
It is obvious that other aspects of the proposals challenge localism to its core. Authorities without local plans will find they are written for them, by the Secretary of State. The NSIP process, where the decision is taken by the Secretary of State, and practically everything is done in writing with minimal opportunities for public hearings, will be available to housing. Will the Conservative party actually stand for this in the long run? Just as George Osborne rediscovered the presumption in favour of development, last in favour during Mrs Thatcher’s Government, and used to great effect by Nicholas Ridley, the then Secretary of State with responsibility for planning, will he also rediscover the Conservative voter’s aversion to being told what to do by central government? The Thatcher/Ridley approach led to a lot of development, sometimes at odds with rather long in the tooth local plans. But it was at Foxley Wood, a proposal for a new town at Bramshill Plantation near Reading that it met its nemesis. Chris Patten, by then Secretary of State in place of Nicholas Ridley, refused permission, finding that he was at odds with the local somewhat Conservative electorate. This led eventually to the s.54A duty to take decisions in accordance with the local plan unless material considerations indicated otherwise.
Will this pattern repeat itself? The reaction to Sir Howard Davies’ Airports Commission report into where to site the next runway in the South East is not encouraging. On the day the report was published – 1st July 2015 – recommending a third runway at Heathrow, the Prime Minister, who some years ago rejected that idea but set up the Commission, announced that a decision would be taken by the end of the year, clearly signalling that the Government is willing to overrule the Commission’s recommendations, which have cost £20 million and taken two and half years’ work. (figures from The Times online, 1st July 2015).
It is probably significant that the lead on planning policy is, under this and the previous government, to be found at the Treasury and BIS. But the question is will the current Secretary of State with responsibility for planning decisions, Greg Clarke, turn out to be a Ridley or a Patten?
Here is a link to Fixing the Foundations.
The fire last week at Clandon Park in Surrey has reduced the house to a shell. It was an imposing 18th Century house, built in the Palladian Style for Thomas Onslow whose great-grandfather. Sir Richard Onslow, an MP in the Long Parliament had acquired the estate about a hundred years earlier. His family have been active in English political life since then but by the 1950s the cost of maintaining Clandon Park had become prohibitive and it was given to the National Trust.
Clandon Park had marble chimney pieces by Rysbrack. It housed the Gubbay collection of furniture and porcelain; Meissen figures; and Mortlake tapestries. It was also the home of the Surrey Infantry Museum.
But now it is no more. Aerial photographs show it to be a shell, open roofless to the sky. Sir Simon Jenkins, the chairman of the National Trust until last year, wrote in yesterday’s Sunday Times urging its reinstatement as a facsimile, as it would have been when first built. “What better task for a new generation of curators and craftsmen? What more intriguing process for visitors to witness?” he writes.
But this is a sad attitude. It suggests that the past was always better than now. It lacks confidence in today. And it ignores what Clandon really was. The house burnt out last week itself replaced an Elizabethan building. Its interiors were altered later in the 18th century. And as Jenkins himself writes, “Its porch was Victorian”. Whilst the house, designed by the Italian architect Giacomo Leoni who helped bring Palladianism to England, is reckoned to be his masterpiece, the truth is that it is no more. The building’s contents had been assembled by the National Trust since the 1950s. In reality it was a museum, and Jenkins’ proposal is to refurnish it commenting that “The world has 18th century furniture and artworks aplenty”. Would that really be so special? To bring some of the world’s abundant 18th century artefacts to a house rebuilt to pretend to be the original. But that would not recreate the original, because the original was a home, and the rebuild would be a museum. A facsimile will not be truthful. Rather it will promote a rose-tinted view of the past. We forget when we look at these places that life expectancy in the 18th century was short, infant mortality high, hygeine poor, pollution abundant, travel and leisure the preserve of the rich. We forget also that the architects of the past used the best of the technology of their day. We forget that Georgian windows owe their beautiful proportions to the technology of that day – the panes were the largest that could be produced using the most advanced techniques.
Why not instead accept that a catastrophe has occurred a Clandon? The house of yesterday has been lost. It may be that there is a desire still to admire the beautiful Palladian architecture (though, as with 18th century furniture the world is not short of glorious Palladian architecture either, e.g the Queen’s House at Greenwich and the White House in Washington, not to mention many of Palladio’s own masterpieces around Vicenza) in which case Clandon could be retained as a ruin. But surely we should ask rather what is actually needed at Clandon Park in the first quarter of the 21st century. Is the need actually for a museum? What are the choices? Might someone want an isolated new house in the countryside?
If there is some need, then let us build something which has the confidence to anounce that it is a 21st century creation, something in today’s style, designed by one of today’s great architects, someone with the confidence to change what we see, to leave a visible mark, to do better? Let us use the technology of today to produce a building of significance, perhaps better than the Clandon Park of yesterday. Or will we just produce a replica, something which pretends to be that which it is not, which deludes its visitors and the uninformed, a monument to backward looking thinking?
The procedure for deemed discharge of conditions came into force on 15th April. It is contained in the new Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure)(England) Order 2015 (“DMPO”). DMPO is a development order made under (amongst other powers) s.59 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. It seems to me that there is a serious flaw in the deemed discharge provisions.
In simple terms they work like this. An application is made in the usual way for the approval under the condition. Any time after six weeks later, a “deemed discharge notice” can be given by the applicant to the local planning authority under Article 29 specifying a date on which deemed discharge will take effect. That date is no earlier than when the period for determination in Article 27 elapses (eight weeks) and 14 days “after the day immediately following that on which the deemed discharge notice is received. (Actually all the periods are calculated in ways like that, so we need to read the small print carefully. Serving notice a day early is not a good idea.) Unless the local planning authority give notice of their decision on the Article 27 application before that deemed discharge date, or a later date agreed in writing, deemed discharge occurs on the date specified in the deemed discharge notice.
So, thinking about the small print, the deemed discharge is all subject to Article 30. This says that deemed discharge does not apply to conditions in the exemptions listed in Schedule 6. To address the environmental impact directive problems (encountered especially in the review of minerals permissions conditions over the past twenty years or so) the exemptions include permissions for EIA development, and development which would have been EIA development but for the condition. There are other exemptions for environmental and sensitive matters. And it does not apply to the approval of reserved matters. This post does not address them all.
But I do want to address a very significant exemption in Schedule 6 (paragraph 10). This states that the deemed discharge procedure does not apply to conditions attached to the grant of planning permission under a development order pursuant to s.59 of the 1990 Act. DMPO is just such a development order, made under s.59 – see my opening comments, and the deemed discharge provisions must be contained in a development order (see s.74A). DMPO gives the procedure for the grant of planning permission. As s.59 says:
“A development order may either—
(a) itself grant planning permission for development specified in the order … ; or
(b) in respect of development for which planning permission is not granted by the order itself, provide for the granting of planning permission by the local planning authority … on application to the authority … in accordance with the provisions of the order.”
Category (a) is an order like the “Permitted Development Order” (defined by DMPO to mean the GPDO 2015). Category (b) is the ordinary grant of permission. The grant of planning permission is made under DMPO. So paragraph 10 of Sch 6 appears to mean that all conditions on ordinary planning permissions are outside its scope. If that is right, deemed discharge does not work. If there is a clear contrary view I would be delighted to hear it – the comments facility is open.
Of course, we know what Para 10 is meant to be addressing; it should refer to conditions under Schedule 2 of the Permitted Development Order. Elsewhere in DMPO, the Permitted Development Order is correctly referred to. For example, in Article 27 where the time periods for decisions on conditions applications are made.
A simple amendment to paragraph 10 would deal with the problem, and I would urge DCLG to make that amendment without delay. Not to do so will leave a flaw to be exploited by those who would seek to stop development. It will be a trap for unwary and busy lawyers. It will create uncertainty, which funders will hate. The development industry will be very disappointed by this problem. I have not alerted DCLG to this view separately, though I will be sending them a link to this, because my experience of doing so on other errors in the past has been highly unsatisfactory.
The Government consulted on this on 20th February. To follow up my earlier post on it here are my ten suggestions.
1 Amend s.106 to remove the restrictions on what a s.106 agreement can do, and particularly improve it for affordable housing
2 Revoke Reg 123 of the Community Infrastructure Regulations 2010 which restricts pooling
3 Revoke Reg 122 of the Community Infrastructure Regulations 2010, which has spawned at least eight cases in the less than five years since coming into force, in an area which was practically devoid of litigation. The cases are now even stopping planning authorities from recovering their legal costs, which in an area where the consultation acknowledges there is “limited legal capacity” is counter-intuitive.
4 Make the presumptions of due execution apply expressly to s.106 agreements and expand the rules on searches and priority periods so that they apply to s.106 agreements
5 Revoke that part of the Planning Inspectorate’s guidance on s.106s which discourages the use of counterparts; they considerably speed up the entirely uncontroversial task of executing and completing s.106s
6 Allow s.106 agreements to contract out of the requirement that all persons deriving title are bound by the agreement. It cannot be right always to make all successors liable.
7 Follow and enforce the long-standing policy advice to use conditions rather than s.106 agreements unless the matter cannot be addressed by a condition
8 Encourage applicants to appeal where a s.106 agreement cannot be agreed or is delayed. They are reluctant to do so because they fear the Secretary of State will open up areas of the planning application they have agreed with the local planning authority. But a well prepared application should have little to fear on that issue
9 Use twin-tracking positively – the practice of appealing while simultaneously negotiating a settlement of the dispute has fallen out of favour; planning authorities have seen as having a gun to their head. But it is no different from ordinary dispute resolution, where the parties can compromise up to the door of the court.
10 Recognise that s.106 agreements are complicated – fund and equip planning departments and their legal departments accordingly
The Government issued this consultation last Friday, 20th February. The period closes on 19th May, so a rapid response is necessary.
The proposals in brief are:
1 Issue new guidance emphasising the need for speed, early engagement and use of standardised clauses.
2 A system for resolving disputes about s.106 agreements.
It is good to see encouragement on the use of standardised clauses. The Law Society issued a model s.106 agreement in 2006, followed by a second edition in 2010. The 2006 edition was endorsed in Circular 5/2005. It would be good to see new official encouragement to use the model.
What about dispute resolution? I want to highlight two things – the consultation asks whether resolution of the planning agreement should include the grant of planning permission and which bodies would be appropriate to adjudicate.
Can you resolve the s.106 without resolving the application? The terms of the permission and its conditions are often affected by what is in the s.106. Some matters can be dealt with by either mechanism, for example a restriction on opening until a construction contract is let. That was in a s.106 in the case of Derwent Holding v. Trafford BC (1), but where demolition of listed buildings is concerned the statute says use a condition to ensure a construction contract is let. If it is needed it needs to be in one or the other and what we don’t want is inconsistent provisions in both. In complex developments, clauses in s.106s are used in combination with conditions to resolve difficult issues. So the two need to be settled together.
But more importantly, what is to happen if the permission issued is different from what the parties expect, or indeed is delayed, or not issued at all? The Law Society’s model is largely conditional on the issue of the permission in a form attached to the s.106, and also conditional on implementation of the permission which can help. But that is in the context of “agreement”. In a case where the planning authority “loses” the dispute resolution, there is a stronger possibility of a non-compliant permission, or delay, or refusal. The applicant has a right of appeal against refusal, whether express or deemed, but there will be delay and in the meantime circumstances may have changed. The s.106 agreement however will have been signed, perhaps many months before, and given that the parties have just fought an appeal, the desire to renegotiate it is not likely to be found on both sides.
If we are to have a dispute resolution mechanism for s.106s, who should adjudicate? There are two areas of conflict; content and legal drafting. Lawyers are used to addressing both. Planning solicitors draft s.106 agreements day in, day out, and we should recognise that some of the delays come from having to draft in the current unhelpful statutory framework. They should hold the necessary expertise, especially members of the Law Society’s Planning Panel, and be the first choice for dispute resolution.
Section 106 agreements are used much more now than they were 25 or so years ago, when s.106 was last given a fundamental overhaul by the Planning and Compensation Act 1991. Government needs to recognise that they are not simple documents. They affect the title to the land and need to be negotiated and drafted properly. The 1991 reform introduced quite unnecessary complexities which are still causing problems for practitioners (see my comments on Savage v. Mansfield (2) for a recent example).
Regulations 122 and 123(3) of the CIL Regulations 2010 making the policy tests law and restricting pooling have made matters even worse. The Planning Inspectorate has found it necessary to require confirmation that s.106s are properly executed, which reflects concerns about whether the presumptions of due execution lawyers rely on in sales and purchases apply to s.106 (there is no obvious “sale” particularly not of a planning permission). It is not possible to carry out a search of the Land Registry with priority either, as priority is not conferred where there is no purchase of land. And there are some problems which are not well known. These issues need to be addressed.
But as everybody knows it is the negotiation of affordable housing provisions which regularly delays and complicates s.106 agreements. The 1991 reforms limited what can be done in a s.106 and they make it difficult to draft for affordable housing. If these provisions could be turned into money payment provisions that would greatly speed things up. But that is not attractive to developers who when on-site can build more cheaply than an affordable housing provider. And as long as the State is not going to build housing itself, is not attractive to local or central government.
These documents secure important benefits for authorities, and if they are not right, the community will lose out, and the planning permission will become voidable.
The consultation is open until 19th March and can be read here.
(1)  EWCA (Civ) 832
(2)  EWCA Civ 4
Earlier this month, DCLG issued a “Plain English Guide to the Planning System”. It is only 20 pages long, including title pages, so it’s bound to be something of a summary. But on planning obligations is continues to misrepresent the position. It says:
“Planning obligations are used to mitigate the impact of proposed developments. They are commonly secured under section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended). A developer may be asked by a local planning authority to enter into an obligation to, for example, undertake works, provide affordable housing or provide additional funding for services. Any planning obligation must meet the tests of being:
• necessary to make the development acceptable in planning terms,
• directly related to the development; and
• fairly and reasonably related in scale and kind to the development. “
There are three things wrong with this.
1 It confuses the desire to secure certain things with the tool used to achieve that. So the wish is to ensure that impacts are mitigated. There are several tools to do that. The first tool is conditions. Many impacts can be mitigated by imposing a condition. For example particular materials can be specified, or the construction of protection required as part of the development or before development occurs. Planning policy has for many years been to use conditions in preference to section 106 agreements. Other tools are the description of the development permitted, and of course s.106 itself. This distinction is important because the confusion fosters the now deep-seated tendency to call for “planning obligations” to secure extraneous benefits, or some sort of community gain.
2 It says that planning obligations can be secured under legislation other than s.106. “They are commonly secured under section 106” Let’s get this clear; planning obligations can only be secured by s.106. They are a creature of s.106 which defines them very closely. My post of a couple of days ago shows what happens when people go outside what s.106 allows – the promise is no planning obligation at all, and cannot be enforced against successors in title using the mechanism specifically designed for that purpose – s.106 itself.
3 It says that all planning obligations must meet the tests now found in Reg 122 of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010. This completely ignores the fact that Reg 122 simply prevents a non-conforming planning obligation from being taken into account in the grant of planning permission. There is nothing to stop a planning obligation being given separately from the grant of permission, though that is rare. But also, it ignores Derwent Holdings v. Trafford BC EWCA Civ 832 and Savage v. Mansfield EWCA Civ 4 which clearly allow planning obligations which deliver the desirable and not only the necessary, directly related and reasonable.
Why is this important? Firstly, it leads to the sort of errors we saw in Savage v. Mansfield. Where planning permission is granted relying on a benefit which is not secured within s.106 it will mean that the planning permission is voidable, unless (as is rarely the case) it is enforceable under other legislation. Section 16 of the Greater London Council (General Powers) Act 1974 is one such example, but as it says on the tin, it doesn’t apply outside Greater London. This is a very easy way in for objectors to quash a valuable permission.
Secondly, it delays planning and gives planning obligations a bad name. It takes time to negotiate s.106 agreements, and conditions are much faster. By suggesting that planning obligations are the device of choice to secure mitigation, simpler solutions are ignored.
Thirdly it leads legislators and policy makers to focus on s.106, which is just a legal device to make promises enforceable against successors in title, rather than policy. Positive promises do not run with the land, and negative promises can only enforced by landowners who own land designed to benefit from them. So, planning authorities were given the statutory mechanism of s.106 to enforce these. But as long ago as 1991 John Gummer limited what old s.106 could do and imposed the current straitjacket on drafting in, it is reckoned, a desire to put an end to “planning gain”, the buying and selling of planning permissions. But this laudable policy objective is best controlled by the Secretary of State intervening where he or she sees abuse of the system. The call-in power is there for situations like that. But instead, the wide powers to ensure that promises can be enforced were cut down by the Planning and Compensation Act 1991 which required promises to fit within a narrowly drafted s.106(1) in order to be enforceable against successors in title. The result has been convoluted drafting of s.106 agreements ever since, and cases like Savage v. Mansfield.
Fourthly it leads to mistakes by legislators and Government legal draftsmen who in Regulations 122 and 123 of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010 ban things from being done under s.106 which with a little legal ingenuity can be done under other powers. Regulations 122 and 123 ought to focus on the substance of the promise rather than the legal route used to enforce it.
And fifthly, it suggests the policy makers at DCLG really don’t understand the system. Which would be a shame because the rest of the guidance is very helpful and definitely clearly written.
The Expanding Universe
Ouch. My planning law colleague Stephen Ashworth of Dentons has put up a post today on their UK Planning Law Blog with this title. He reports that the Government’s changes last November to make development easier for small developers by reducing the thresholds for affordable housing and tariff style contributions are being challenged in the High Court by Reading and West Berkshire Councils with the support of a number of others.
One of the issues will be that DCLG did not carry out any analysis of the numbers of affordable homes or cash likely to be lost before promoting the policy. Stephen writes, “Whilst there may well be good public policy justifications for the changes, promoting new policy without at least some public understanding of the consequences is just daft. It is tantamount to faith based planning.” I hope that Stephen doesn’t mean that faith is daft. We do things by faith all the time. Presumably he – like me – takes Paracetamol when he has a headache and has faith that it works. And by faith I accept that the universe is expanding – scientists and astronomers I do not know tell me this but even they know that is only a theory to which they subscribe until there is a better one. And the Bible tells us that “Faith is confidence in what we hope for and assurance about what we do not see” – Hebrews Chapter 11 verse 1. At the risk of inviting Richard Dawkins to contribute, there is plenty of good evidence for the death and resurrection of Jesus, and as a practising Christian myself I do not regard it “daft” to believe and to have faith in God.
Here is a link to Stephen’s post. Thanks Stephen for giving me the opportunity to bring the important things in life into my blog.